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Soft Paternalism purports to be a distinct kind of paternalism. Standard ‘hard’
paternalism is the interference of a state or an individual with another person, against
their will, and justified by a claim that the person interfered with will be better off or
protected from harm (Dworkin 2005). Because this interference limits a person’s freedom
without her consent, standard paternalism is opposed to liberalism. Soft Paternalism, in
contrast, purports to be compatible with it. It claims that it ‘steers’ people in welfare-
promoting directions, but that it leaves people the choice whether to opt out of this
influence. Thus, the claim goes, Soft Paternalism ‘nudges’ people towards their own
good without coercing them. It therefore provides the benefits of benevolent care minus
the drawbacks of heavy-handed interference. In this claim, Soft Paternalism (a term most
often used in the media, compare e.g. Economist April 6
th 2006), is similar to
Asymmetrical Paternalism (Camerer et al. 2003), Light Paternalism (Loewenstein and
Haisley forthcoming) and Libertarian Paternalism (Sunstein and Thaler 2003).  In the
following, I will refer to all of these accounts by the abbreviation ‘SP’ and differentiate
further were necessary.
In this paper, I question the purported categorical difference between Soft Paternalism
and standard paternalism. In particular, I will argue that SP policies do not deserve to be
called ‘liberal’ or ‘libertarian’, because the notions of welfare with which it justifies its
interference are in contradiction to liberal notions of value.
My argument starts with the observation that SP policies curtail choice and therefore
limit freedom. Prima facie, they therefore violate the idea of liberalism, unless
appropriately justified. As I will show, Soft Paternalists justify the limitation of freedom
by turning the focus from rights to goodness: the right of freedom can be limited, they
argue, for the sake of improving the good of the person so constrained. Such an argument
may justify the limitation of rights – I am not contesting that some instances of ‘hard’
paternalism may be thus justified. But such an argument amounts to a justification of SP
as policies compatible with liberal ideas only if the notion of goodness relied on is
compatible with liberalism. After reviewing the three dominant liberal accounts of value,
I argue that the notion(s) of welfare currently used by SP do not adhere to any of these2
accounts, in particular because they neither respect the individuality, plurality or
subjectivity of value.  I therefore conclude that while SP policies that interfere with
people’s choices may be justified when pursued with people’s welfare in mind, they
cannot be justified as liberal policies.
1. SP limits freedom
Distinguishing themselves from ‘hard’ paternalists, Soft Paternalists stress their
commitment to freedom of choice. For example,
in general, people should be free to opt out of specified arrangements if they
choose to do so… we do not aim to defend any approach that blocks individual
choices. (Sunstein and Thaler 2003, 1161)
At times, advocates of SP seem to imply that their proposed policies do not interfere with
freedom of choice at all. Some have argued that if that were the case, there would be no
reason to treat these policies as ‘paternalistic’, and hence the controversy whether these
policies were compatible with liberal positions would disappear (Klein 2003, 266). In
contrast, I believe that there are paternalistic policies that at least do not coerce and do
not limit individuals’ freedom of choice (for illustrative examples, see Kleinig 1983). Yet
they may constrain other kinds of freedom, and for this reason be incompatible with
liberal positions. The first task, therefore, is to investigate whether SP policies limit
freedom, and if yes, what kind of freedom they constrain.
SP policies aim to improve individual choices. It is important to clarify who administers
these policies. If it is a government, citizens may be given an opportunity to opt of out of
specified arrangements, but they remain subject to the underlying aim the government
sets for them. If it is a company or an association, in contrast, people are commonly able
to avoid being subject to such a plan or goal by soliciting another company or declining
membership in the association.
1 In the following, I will restrict myself to cases in which a
government administrates these policies.
2
SP interference often comes in small redesigning steps of existing institutions. The goal
of such redesign is to ‘steer people’s choices in welfare-promoting directions’ (Sunstein
and Thaler 2003, 1159). Typical examples include getting people to save more for
1 It is an interesting question whether a government should enforce contracts between its citizens and
companies or associations, in which citizens enter self-binding agreements (such as forfeiting large sums of
money when failing a self-imposed goal). Yet this will be the subject for another paper. Here, I restrict
myself to case where the government identifies the citizens’ good, and seeks to improve their choices with
various active policies.
2 Through this restriction, I fail to address the entirety of SP policies. See for example Thaler (2007) ‘It is
both wrong and misleading to characterize libertarian paternalism as primarily and activity of
governments’. But plenty of interesting SP cases remain inside the domain that I set out to discuss.3
retirement, to reflect about the various consequences before making a binding decision,
and not to act on impulses. ‘Steering’ in this way is justified by reference to the growing
literature that documents systematic mistakes and biases of human reasoning and
decision-making, in particular inertia, framing effects and ill-formed preferences. SP try
to help people avoiding these mistakes. In particular, such interferences involve:
(1) [change of] default rules; (2) provision or re-framing of information; (3)
cooling-off periods; and (4) limiting consumer choices (Camerer et al. 2003,
1224)
None of the listed policies involve directly force people to do or cease anything. Default
rules simple determine what will be the case if an agent does not make a choice; agents
can always decide against the default. Information goes into agents’ deliberations, but
cannot determine them; agents can always decline to use the information, or they can go
and research on their own. Cooling-off periods do only delay choices, but do not prevent
them; for the relevant scenarios, the delay is considered to produce only trifling costs.
Last, limiting choices is only envisaged in situations in which the number of choices is so
large that it is considered an impediment to efficient and well-considered choice.
Nevertheless, it would be rash to think that ‘since no one is forced to do anything, … this
steering should be unobjectionable to libertarians’ (Thaler and Sunstein 2003, 177).
Although not forcing its citizens to choose, a government that seeks to ‘steer’ them in the
discussed way clearly has the intention to influence their choices. The mere fact that the
government tries to impose itself onto its citizens in these matters – by however innocent
means - already limits their freedom in a fashion objectionable to liberals. Pettit, for
example, characterises an individual as unfree if ‘subject to the potentially capricious will
or the potentially idiosyncratic judgment of another’ (Pettit 1997, 5, my emphasis). Just
by forming the intention to interfere for these reasons, a government increases the
‘defenseless susceptibility to interference’ (Pettit, 1996: 577) of its citizens, and therefore
decreases the degree ofrepublican liberty that they had enjoyed.
The policies proposed by SP further can be seen as coercing agents in a circumlocutory
way. Coercion, Berlin (169, 122) reminds us, ‘implies the deliberate interference of other
human beings within the area in which I could otherwise act’. The softly paternalist
government knows from behavioural research that people are influenced through their
environment and through the way how their options are presented to them. This
knowledge forms the basis to justify intervention. But this knowledge also helps the
paternalist understanding how to intervene in order to get people to do whet the
paternalist wants them to do. By changing the default, for example, the government
actively seeks to impose that option onto its citizens. By providing specific information,
especially in a rhetorically exaggerated way – it seeks to change the properties of4
people’s choice options (think of the difference between a pack of cigarettes with and
without the warning ‘smoking kills’!). And by delaying choices or limiting them, the
government takes influence onto the number of people’s alternatives of choice. More
generally, the results from behavioural research, combined with the ability to intervene in
environments relevant for peoples deliberations and choices, offers policymakers a large
potential for subtle manipulation. True, it does not prevent individuals from choosing
how to act, but it makes use of its manipulative means to control how individuals will
choose. In this way, the government takes considerable influence on ‘the area in which
they could otherwise act’. Many SP policies therefore are coercive in this circumlocutory
way, and hence decrease even the degree of negative liberty enjoyed by citizens.
This verdict is not ameliorated by the purported lack of alternatives to such paternalistic
policies. It is true that ‘in many situations, some organization or agent must make a
choice that will affect the choices of some other people’ (Thaler and Sunstein 2003, 175).
However, it just does not follow from this that a ‘private and public institutions cannot
possible avoid a form of paternalism, so long as they establish default rules and starting
points’ (Sunstein 2007, my emphasis). Paternalism is commonly defined as an
interference with the exclusive purpose of improving that agent’s welfare whose choice is
interfered with (Dworkin 2005). The fact that institutions necessarily shape people’s
environments one way or another, and thereby inadvertently affect their choice, does not
imply that paternalism is inevitable. The government may have shaped the environment
(for example, introducing co-ed military training in order to comply with gender equality
requirements) without intending certain consequences for the citizens’ (in this case
recruits’) beliefs and preferences. Or it may be aware of the effect of necessary
regulations on citizens’ preferences, but does not regulate for the purpose of welfare
improvement. Those cases of government action would be regulative, but not
paternalistic – the government constraints individuals' choice, but it does not impose its
will onto them. Such regulation simply lacks the aim of doing something to these
individuals, of controlling their deliberations or choices. In other words, while existing
institutions may have, in one way or another, already influenced individual choice, SP
adds a new quality to these influences by turning them into interferences with the
intention of welfare improvement.
3 This is a new property that SP contributes to
regulation, and hence paternalistic policies are not inevitable.
Advocates of SP reply that the alternatives to welfare-enhancing interferences are
‘choosing options to make people sick, obese or generally worse off’ (Thaler and
Sunstein 2003, 175). But this again does not follow. It may be the case that certain
3 E.g. ‘we urge that [both legal and organizational rules] should be chosen with the explicit goal of
improving the welfare of the people affected by them.'  (Sunstein and Thaler 2003, 1161)5
regulations have consequences that are not optimal from a welfare-enhancing point of
view. But a government that does not make it its task to maximise its citizens’ welfare
does not necessarily choose to make people worse off. Rather, it withholds judgment on
the welfare consequences of the regulation. Disregarding the welfare consequences is not
necessarily an oversight. One reason why it may be legitimate to withhold judging
regulations by an overarching consequentialist criterion is to preserve and stress their
tentative nature. Judging that a certain regulation is ‘best’ for people makes it to some
extent immune to later adjustment – unless the welfare judgment itself is called into
question. In contrast, maintaining the tentative nature of the regulation allows respecting
a wider range of concerns, for example regarding the affected persons’ rights or self-
development. For instance, it allows that people learn about their own mistakes, and
subsequently request adjusting the regulation in order to help them avoid these mistakes
in the future. Such a ‘tentative’ organisation of inevitable inferences is thus a third option
between the interferences striving to make people better off, and the absurd contrasting
case of interferences to make people worse off.
I conclude that while SP does not directly coerce people, it does limit their freedom in
important ways. One thus has to be cautious with claims that SP does ‘without
eliminating freedom of choice’ (Sunstein and Thaler 2003, 1159), and that it ‘also
make[s] room for freedom of choice (Sunstein and Thaler 2003, 1166). One must not
understand them as saying that SP does not affect people’s freedom at all. Rather, what
they say is that SP does not eliminate freedom of choice - but that it limits it, and that it
limits other kinds of freedom, like the freedom of being let alone.
It is true that the various forms of liberalism and libertarianism also limit freedom of
choice to secure certain ends. In order to enforce personal and property rights and
contractual agreements, for example, the main versions of libertarianism limit the choice
of potential violators. In order to maintain people’s ability to individual independence
and autonomy, some versions of liberalism curtail the choices of those who could
infringe it. The discussed SP policies, however, limit the freedom of individuals to
determine and pursue their conceptions of the good for other reasons than those put
forward by these versions of liberalism and libertarianism. SP therefore must justify these
limitations of liberty, if it is supposed to be compatible with liberal positions.
2. Justifying SP interferences
Not every limitation of liberty constitutes a violation of liberal principles. If such
limitations are appropriately justified, then they may be compatible with liberalism. The
stress, however, lies on appropriate justification, according to the Fundamental Liberal
Principle:6
Freedom is normatively basic, and so the onus of justification is on those who
would limit freedom, especially through coercive means. (Gaus, 1996: 162-166)
But what does justification mean in this context? The most common reading is that
enjoying one’s own liberty is limited by others’ liberty (cf. ‘liberty can be limited only
for the sake of liberty’, Rawls 1999, 204). Thus while individuals’ liberty is not
unlimited, it is limited by the same principle that sets freedom as normatively basic. Such
a limitation of liberty through reference to liberty itself is clearly within the liberal
framework.
However, SP cannot take recourse to such a justification. Its argument to limit liberty
does not refer to liberty, but to welfare. Asymmetric Paternalism, for example, proposes
paternalistic policies where the welfare gains through improved decisions offset the
losses through restricting people:
A regulation is asymmetrically paternalistic if it creates large benefits for those who
make errors, while imposing little or no harm on those who are fully rational.
(Camerer et al. 2003, 1212, my emphasis)
This is an important switch from the common interpretation of the Fundamental Liberal
Principle. Instead of reading the principle as arbitrating between the liberty of different
people, it is now read as requiring that limitations of liberty are appropriately
compensated by gains in other values, in particular the welfare of those whose liberties
are limited. Liberty now can be traded off (to some extent) against other values.
As defenders of SP themselves point out, this trade-off is compatible with liberal or
libertarian views only if these views endorsed freedom as an instrumental value that is
derived from some underlying concern for welfare:
We propose a form of paternalism, libertarian in spirit, that should be acceptable to
those who are firmly committed to freedom of choice on grounds of either
autonomyor welfare. (Sunstein and Thaler 2003, 1160, my emphasis)
But can liberal positions be legitimately said to be committed to freedom of choice on
grounds of welfare?
4 Mill’s insistence on people’s freedom of tastes and pursuits (Mill
1975, ch. 1 near end), for example, seems to deny that. For them and other liberal
authors, basic liberties have absolute priority over other political values; they cannot be
sacrificed or weighted off against non-basic rights in ordinary political procedures.
These liberal positions thus stand in marked contrast to SP. For SP, freedom is no longer
4 I will focus on the trade-off between liberty and welfare here, because all current versions of SP pursue
this line. The alternative argument – a trade-off between liberty and autonomy - is considerably more
complex, but may offer a justification of SP policies - although current versions of SP do not attempt it. For
arguments in favour of paternalism on the grounds of autonomy, see Young 1986, D’Agostino 1982).7
normatively basic, but is derived from the consideration that granting freedom is a
potentially good way of increasing people's welfare.
5 If it then transpires that for certain
choices, unlimited freedom does not yield optimal welfare results, then the limitation of
this freedom is justifiable. From this perspective, it might seem, many 'hard' paternalistic
policies could be comfortably legitimised. As long as it can be shown that people benefit
from interventions in the appropriate way (taking into account population heterogeneity),
such interventions may seem acceptable. Whatever is deemed beneficial for a person
might be imposed on her with the help of this argument - even if this person explicitly
rejects the notion that this something is in fact beneficial for her.
What needs to be argued, at the very least, in order to make SP part of the liberal camp, is
that the values for which SP proposes to trade certain degrees of freedom conform to
those accepted in liberal positions. In brief, this means that the persons affected consider
the intervention and its results a good thing according to their own values. This leads us
on shaky grounds, as we will have to investigate some of the psychological foundations
of liberal theory. But as SP itself uses psychological research for justificatory purposes,
this seems unavoidable. In the next section, three prominent notions of liberal value are
discussed.
3. Concepts of liberal welfare
The notion of welfare is notoriously ambiguous, as issues ranging from its conceptual
clarification down to its measurement have not been sufficiently resolved. The way SP
use the notion of ‘welfare’ contributes to this ambiguity: as I will show in the next
section, they want to sometimes detach it from preferences or choices, but remain unclear
how to measure it otherwise. What is clear, however, is that by ‘welfare’ they mean some
good for a person, for which it may be justified to trade in some freedom of that (or
other) individuals. This raises the very general question what they may consider as the
good of a person, and what kind of general judgments they are licensed to make about the
welfare consequences of policies affecting a group of people. To put this in context, I
review three liberal accounts of value in this section.
The perfectionist account proposes that what is good for a person is to be a well-
developed human being, with her facilities cultivated according to her capacities, and her
individuality matured.
5 Compare, for example: ‘Our principal concern here is with welfare and consequences, though as we
suggest below, freedom of choice is sometimes an ingredient in welfare.'(Sunstein and Thaler 2003, 1167,
fn 22)8
What more can be said of any condition of human affairs, than that it brings
human beings themselves nearer to the best thing they can be? (Mill 1859/1975,
79).
While some features of ‘being well developed’ may be shared by all human beings,
human capacities vary widely: individuality implies heterogeneity of well-developed
capacities. The best way to realise such a state of heterogeneous perfection may therefore
be to bestow significant liberties to the individuals, who may know their capacities best
and may also understand best how to realise them. Beyond this instrumental justification
of self-realisation, however, Mill also makes clear that individual self-determination is an
end in itself:
... a man's mode of laying out his own existence is best not because it is the best in
itself, but because it is his own mode... (Mill 1859/1975, 67)
On this view, to promote individuals’ good is to promote development or perfection.
Governing institutions must be evaluated in terms of their ability to enable each person to
exercise and develop in his or her own way their capacities for higher forms of human
happiness. Whatever the concrete content of value is in this conception, it is always
characterized by a high degree of individuality and heterogeneity – both as a means to
realize these values, and as an end in itself.
The pluralist account proposes an objective account of values, but acknowledges that
there is a plurality of values, both in the sense that these values may not be comparable,
and in the sense that they may be incomprehensible.
 “we are faced with choices between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally
absolute, the realisation of some of which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of
others” (Berlin 1969, 169)
Incomparability may simply mean that values cannot be ranked by a single, ultimate
scale. But Berlin seems to further suggest that that each value, being sui generis, cannot
be judged in relation to any other value, because there is nothing to judge them both in
relation to (Berlin 1990). As a result, choices among values, and choices of the processes
by which individuals determine their good, cannot be based on (objectively valid)
evaluative comparisons, but only on personal preference, or on an act of radical choice.
On this view, to promote individuals’ good is to promote the values that individuals have
determined as their values, and to allow people to promote these values in ways that they
themselves have chosen.
The subjectivist account proposes that what a person values rests on experiences that vary
from person to person. There is not list of objective values at all (in however pluralist a
setting), hence nothing that an individual values can be considered not good for her. Our9
ideas about what is valuable stem from our desires or tastes, and these differ from one
individual to another.
pleasant Tastes depend not on the things themselves, but their agreeableness to this or
that particulare Palate, wherein there is great variety…(Locke 1975 [1706]: 269).
On this view, individuals’ good consists in the satisfaction of their preferences. These
preferences do not only pertain to states, but also to the way these states are reached.
Thus to promote individuals’ good is to satisfy their preferences in the way they prefer.
The particular liberal aspect of all three of theses accounts of value is that they respect
different ways of living a good life that reasonable people may pursue. While each
account takes different things as the basis of value – development, objective values or
desires – the respect for individual judgement incorporated in each of them is based on
judging value as individual, plural or subjective. Whether SP will be counted as a liberal
program therefore depends on whether its notion of welfare satisfies at least one of these
properties.
4. SP’s notion of welfare
I now argue that the notions of welfare currently used by SP do not adhere to any of these
accounts, in particular because they neither respect the individuality, plurality nor
subjectivity of value.
In general, SP are sceptical of the use of preferences as the indicator for welfare
consequences of a policy. They argue that preferences are often formed by variables
affected through policy choice, and that in these cases, it is ‘not possible for government
to track those preferences, because they are an artefact of how the question is put'
(Sunstein and Thaler 2003, 1180). In one of their examples, a cafeteria manager must
decide whether to enhance or reduce the prominent placing of coveted but unhealthy
dishes. Sunstein and Thaler argue that the manager cannot rely on 'what customers want',
because:
‘If the arrangement of the alternatives has a significant effect on the selections the
customers make, then their true “preferences” do not formally exist.’ (Sunstein
and Thaler 2003, 1164)
This argument rules out, at least for the discussed cases, that SP can take recourse to the
subjective account of value. Indeed, at another place the authors explicitly reject this
account:
'We intend 'better off' to be measured as objectively as possible, and we clearly do not
always equate revealed preference with welfare.' (Thaler and Sunstein 2003, 175)10
Admittedly, this would still allow for a sophisticated subjectivism, in which those
preferences that withstood some form of refinement test – i.e. those preferences that
remained stable in the face of increased information and reflection – would still count
towards an individual’s welfare. Sunstein and Thaler suggest such a reading, when they
say that
‘in some cases individuals make inferior decisions in terms of their own
welfare—decisions that they would change if they had complete information,
unlimited cognitive abilities, and no lack of self-control.' (Sunstein and Thaler
2003, 1162)
As is well known, this account suffers from major deficits. First, it is not clear what
'complete information', 'unlimited cognitive abilities' and 'no lack of self-control' really
means in the context of human decision-making. In particular, there is no impartial view
what may count as ‘full information’, as a brief consideration of standard decision theory
will show. Decision theory derives the preferences over actions from preferences over
outcomes of these actions in different states of the world. But which states are to be taken
into account? The superficial answer is all states that may pertain, i.e. all states of the
world that are that are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. This answer
neglects that the world can be partitioned in different ways. To take Savages mundane
example of deciding how to make an omelette, the decision maker may take different
degrees of detail into account:
1. Whether a particular egg is rotten. 2. Which, if any, in a particular dozen eggs
are rotten. ... 7. The exact and entire past, present, and future history of the
universe, understood in any sense, however wide. (Savage 1972, 8)
In case 1, the deciding agent partitions the world in only two states, namely one where
that particular egg is rotten and another where it is not. In case 2, with a 6-egg omelette,
she distinguishes 2
6 states already. Case 2 contains more information than case 1, and in
this sense is the ‘larger’ world of the two. The small world of case one is a coarsening of
the partition presented in case 2; each state in case 1 is equivalent to a set of states of case
2.
In search for more complete information, we thus determine the partition that a decision
maker used, and refine it by distinguishing each of her states by additional detail. But
where do we stop? Savages case 7 is of no help here, as there is no unique ‘grand’ world
that would specify universal history in any sense. The world just cannot be analysed into
smallest atoms that act as the building blocs of any partition. We could go on refining
states forever.
There thus is no unique 'most complete' partition to which all decision makers can at least
theoretically appeal to (disregarding the very real problems of cognitive limitations and11
even formal non-computability). Even if one could argue for some partition as the
rational one, thus judgement would depend in multiple ways on the individual decision
maker’s goals, her cognitive abilities and her context (see Broome 1991, 107-115). Even
if one reinterpreted ‘complete information’ as the rational level of detail taken into
account, one would get a notion that was highly individualistic. Considering the world
around us, one can also say that such a notion would be highly pluralistic – that different
people rationally take different degrees of detail into account for their decisions.
The idea of a refinement test thus cannot be used as a universalcriterion for true welfare
that different people receive from a certain course of action. At best, it could be applied
to particular cases, taking particular conditions into account. Yet SP, as currently
conceived, offers no suggestion show such an informed reference account could actually
be constructed.
A second problem for the sophisticated subjectivism account arises from the fact that the
subjectivity of value is closely linked with that person’s experiences. Confronting people
with novel information inevitably will change some of their preferences, hence washing
out the subjective character of their evaluations. Given the arbitrariness of choosing a
universal level of information for all decision-makers involved, this would make it
difficult to distinguish a hypothetical or actual information campaign from a measure to
manipulate individuals. The sophisticated subjectivism account is therefore controversial,
and requires further arguments before it could be applied in the SP context.
In any case, SP authors do not offer suggestions how to construct such informed
preferences and derive welfare measurements from them, but rather offer ad hoc
intuitions for what would count as benefits in the specific situations they discuss. In the
cafeteria case, for example, they suggest that the manager provide 'goods and services
that turn out, in practice, to promote their welfare, all things considered' (Sunstein and
Thaler 2003, 1165), where welfare all things considered is strongly related to average
health risks of certain food intake. In the following, I therefore discuss some of these
cases in order to elicit where these welfare intuitions may come from and how they relate
to liberal positions.
In some cases, the authors link welfare judgments to aggregate data. Claiming that an
increase of 401(k) participation would be highly beneficial, for example, they point out
that ‘the U.S. aggregate saving rate is too low’ (Camerer et al. 2003, 1227). This
observation does not differentiate between the benefits of such a policy for different
people, but just takes the judgment that the average is 'too low' as an indicator that the
majority would benefit from it. Similarly, discussing possible welfare measurements,
Sunstein and Thaler propose to 'select the approach that the majority would choose if
explicit choices were revealed and required' (Sunstein and Thaler 2003, 1194). Of course,12
this faces the problem of how such a counterfactual can be used to measure an actual
variable. But besides that, it is again sugested that the behaviour of the group indicates
the welfare of individuals. By mixing people with potentially widely differing capacities
and individualities into an aggregate measure, this clearly goes against the liberal account
of value as individualistic.
In other cases, welfare is taken to be the material payoff of an activity (or the respective
expected payoff) even though these activities may have relevant non-material welfare
effects for the individuals pursuing them. For example, Camerer et al. discuss the
widespread practice of purchasing state lottery tickets. They argue that these purchases
may be based on miscalculating the effects of large gains with small probabilities, and
suggest radical information campaigns to rectify this problem (by e.g. printing on the
ticket: ‘to win on this ticket is a likely as being hit by lightening over the course of the
next week’). They suggest that such a campaign will lead to a welfare gain, if welfare is
measured as ‘the odds of winning a lottery and of the real payoffs in terms of the after-tax
discounted present value of earnings’ (Camerer et al. 2003, 1231).
But it is not obvious that this is the correct way to measure welfare in this case. Many
people, I suggest, buy lottery tickets not because they hope to improve their income this
way; rather, they see it as a recreational activity, which provides a feeling of adventure, a
modicum of recklessness, that their day-to-day lives lack.
 6 Informing them about the real
odds will not help them in achieving what they desire; but an (implicitly derisive)
message printed on the ticket will change the nature of the good that they covet: it now is
a good that only the stupid or the truly reckless will buy. In these cases, it seems that SP
are concentrating too much on ‘objective’ criteria of material gain, to the detriment of
more idiosyncratic (and more difficult to measure) values.
7 Such a focus neglects the
plurality of values.
In yet other cases, SP seem to privilege certain temporal perspectives in their accounts of
welfare benefits. For example, they judge higher 401(k) participation beneficial, because
of ‘people’s self-reports that they save less than they would like’ (Camerer et al. 2003,
1227). Such self-reports may not be very surprising, as those who splashed out early in
life may complain about their relatively frugal means later on. This does not necessarily
6 A related case – about whose welfare assessment, admittedly, the authors themselves caution – is that of
extended warranties. The authors suggest that extended warranties ‘are enormously profitable to retailers
implies they are costly to buyers (Camerer et al. 2003, 1253-4), again disregarding the subjective feeling of
security and orderliness that at least some of the consumers of extended warranties may experience.
7 It also seems to me a rather clear case of elitist thinking. No one proposes to install such warnings in art
galleries or at luxury jewelers, although the resale value of their products is much lower than the retail
price. Consumers of these products are presumed to know this (although my suspicion is that many do not)
and that they are willing to pay the difference because they derive other advantages from owning them.
Why is this presumption made with respect to buyers of art and jewelry, but not of lottery tickets?13
imply that they now truly wish they had done things differently, or that they would do
things differently if they could. Talk, after all, is cheap; and people’s discounting function
of the past may be as hyperbolic as their discounting of the future. Taking people’s
opinions from the time after the money is spent as an expression of their welfare
judgments thus may lead to highly biased value judgments. I cannot see any reason why
this perspective should be favoured over a value judgment before the money is spent.
SP, however, seems to suggest that such a possible bias is not very hurtful, as ‘the costs
of having too little saved up for retirement are typically greater than the costs of having
saved too much’ (Thaler and Sunstein 2003, 178). Yet by allowing such a bias in their
casual welfare argument, they do not appreciate this plurality of how people value
intertemporal distributions.
8
SP express a similarly insouciant attitude towards the plurality of individual preferences
when using the ‘number of drop-outs’ (Sunstein and Thaler 2003, 1195) as a measure of
the welfare benefit of an SP policy. For example, if employees are presumed to want to
be enrolled in the retirement savings plan, only 15 percent opted out, but when employees
are required to signal their desire to get enrolled, only 45 percent opted in. With these
numbers, the authors argue, there is reason to think that the presumption in favour of
enrolment is better, ‘if only because more people are sufficiently satisfied to leave it in
place’ (ibid.). Yet this way of determining welfare may count as much against SP policies
as for them. Advocates of SP argued for the change of default, because cognitive
mistakes like inertia prevented employees from enrolling in programs that were
beneficial for them. If benefit is characterised by how many people stay with an option,
however, then SP would have had to respect the choices of 55 percent of those who chose
not to get enrolled in the initial default.
Drawing on the recent publications of SP, I therefore conclude that the notions of welfare
discussed there do not cohere with any of the liberal approaches to value. In particular,
the welfare notions of SP respect neither individuality, plurality not subjectivity.
Sometimes, it seems SP eschews reference to any welfare concept altogether, and instead
purports to correct ‘mistakes’ of rational reasoning or deliberation – implicitly claiming
that such corrections by themselves are welfare-improving. Yet this connection is not as
unambiguous as it seems. SP draws to a large extend on research done in psychology and
behavioural economics. This research shows that human beings in their behaviour often
8 A similar case is that of impulsive decisions. SP suggest that ‘the potential benefit of the cooling-off
period is that some irrational types might reverse a costly decision to undertake the action’ (Camerer et al.
2003, 1238-9). But how is costly specified here? “living fast’ and ‘following one’s impulses’ are more than
just phrases. They can be part of a person’s individual concept of life, and as such can be central tenets of
value. The attempt to prevent impulsive decisions (in purchases, in marriage, in suicide) puts a positive spin
on decisions reached after long deliberation, which may not reflect some people’s true values.14
deviate systematically from the descriptions and predictions made by models based on
standard rationality assumptions. The main aim of this research so far has been the
positive description of these deviations. The normative interpretation of this research is
much more controversial. When SP claim that
‘It is such errors—apparent violations of rationality—that can justify the need for
paternalistic policies to help people make better decisions and come closer to
behaving in their own best interest’ (Camerer et al. 2003, 1217-18),
it conflates two normative perspectives on deliberation and behaviour. The rationality of
reasoning and deliberation that is normatively relevant is largely deontologically
justified. This means that reasoning and deliberation is considered rational in a
normatively relevant sense if it coheres with certain rules. Bayes’ Rule is an example of
such an underlying rule. We say that probabilistic reasoning that violates Bayes Rule is
irrational (and all SP papers refer to this example). Sometimes, there are reasons to
support this normative claim, but these reasons tend to be highly abstract.
9
However, rationality deontologically justified does not always square well with
rationality consequentially justified. Rational rules do not necessarily lead to the best
results. This has been the focus of a long discussion in psychology (for an overview, see
Samuels et al. 2004), where it has been argued that ‘simple heuristics’ – unsophisticated
rules of thumb – sometimes outperform rules that are considered rational in the normative
sense. In particular, this is the case in relatively stable environments, in which expensive
extra information and cognition does not have an all-decisive influence on the choice
result. For example, Borges et al (1999) shows that the ‘recognition heuristic’ fares better
than standard probabilistic models in choosing stock market portfolios, Martignon and
Blackmond Laksey (1999) test the ‘Take The Best’ heuristic against three Bayesian
models in a variety of situations, and Bishop (2000) reviews evidence for the fact that
simple and biasing heuristics for various predictive task outperform complex Bayesian
models.
Thus, the relation between not following rational rules and the welfare consequences of
such ‘irrationalities’ are not as clear-cut as the above quote (and the SP literature as a
whole) claims. Even on welfare criteria that SP defenders themselves have used – e.g.
material payoffs - people may do better with their shortcuts and heuristics than with the
approved tools of standard decision theory. What is more, these are their tools, highly
idiosyncratic to individuals, purposes and contexts, and they stand against the equalising
effect of abstract rationality principles. Imposing one rationality thus stands against the
9 Other ‘rationality’ rules are not so well supported. Why, for example, should hyperbolic discounting be
considered normatively irrational?15
liberal principle that people lay out their own mode of existence, and their own mode of
achieving it.
5. Conclusion
I argued that SP’s notion(s) of welfare do not adhere to liberal or libertarian principles.
Because it does propose a trade-off between freedom and welfare, it would need such a
liberal welfare concept in order to support its claim that its from of paternalism is
compatible with liberal ideas, and hence a novel and distinct brand of paternalism. It
therefore seems that they cannot have the cake and eat it, too: SP’s policies are not
compatible with a liberal position. In particular, it is not clear why SP’s arguments do not
lend their support to ‘harder’ paternalisms (without any choice at all, if welfare benefits
are relatively undisputed). The caution that ‘soft’, ‘liberaterian’ or ‘assymmetric’
paternalisms display therefore seems more a concession to current political sensitivities
than a feature that is an integral part of these approaches themselves.
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